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ABSTRACT
This paper points out that for purposes of estimating the total
cost of various health care bills providing comprehensive prepaid care
the relevant concept is not "moral hazard" as usually defined, but
rather relative moral hazard, the tendency for an individual to increase
utilization over what they might have done under a fee-for-service plus
coinsurance system.
Although the empirical results are tentative and preliminary,
they seem to indicate that great per capita jumps in the consumption of




In a recent study in this journal Hyman Joseph [1] compares
utilization of inpatient health care facilities with and without third
party payments and uses these comparisons to draw some conclusions
concerning the existence and character of "moral hazard" resulting from
the reduced direct out-of-pocket costs to the consumer.
In particular he focuses on "length of stay" data and finds that
in seven (out of 22) illness categories, insurance status "significantly"
(in the statistical sense) lengthens the average hospital stay. These
seven illnesses can generally be classified as "less serious" medically
and thus he draws a policy recommendation that "... the type of insurance
plan that would result in less moral hazard would be one that reduces
the percentage of the bill the patient pays as the amount of the bill
increases. This type of plan would be preferable to actuarily equiva-
lent plans that either require the patient to pay a flat percentage of
the bill or require the patient to pay an increasing percentage of the
bill as the bill increases." [1, p. 160-1]
These recommendations are fitting if we are addressing ourselves
to the problem of how best to preserve the "f ee-for-service plus
coinsurance" dominated health care delivery system extant. However,
it is increasingly apparent that the population at large considers
access to adequate health care a right, and that the present delivery
system, without drastic modification, is incapable of fulfilling the
admittedly large increase in demand for medical services that adoption
of such a principle on a national scale would entail.
The extent to which moral hazard may occur is of crucial
importance in attempting to construct a modified health care delivery
system which hopes to satisfy the increased effective demand resulting
from the institution of large scale comprehensive access to care.
The fear is that if we guarantee access to the delivery system
through government finance of care (say in the form of the Kennedy
Health Securities Act on the national scale, or Senator George Moscone's
Consumer Health Protection Act for Californians) utilization will not
only increase because more people are covered, but because people
previously covered by third party insurance will tend to increase their
usage as well, the deductibles and coinsurance features of the health
plans having been dropped. This latter phenomenon we will designate
Relative Moral Hazard.
It is the purpose of this paper to indicate that the probable
degree of such increased utilization of inpatient care ranges from very
small to negative depending on the nature of the disease, and that
credence must be given to expressed fears that the real problem in the
long run is underutilization and not overutilization.
THE STUDY
The working hypothesis for the present study was that in order
to best estimate the potential presence of Relative Moral Hazard, one
should examine utilization figures for an existing delivery system most
closely approximating that which would obtain if large scale comprehen-
sive access to care were implemented. We believe the military health
maintenance organization (HMO) to be such a prototype.
Military personnel and their dependents are effectively enrollees
in a prepaid comprehensive health care delivery plan with no deductibles
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and only a nominal copayment for inpatient room charges. They are
entitled to financially unlimited access to both in and outpatient
medical facilities. The only rationing mechanism is the queue which
forms if demand is temporarily greater than the existing supply.
The medical personnel are likewise either military or civilian
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salaried employees with no economic incentive to overprescribe care.
For these reasons it is felt that careful study of the utiliza-
tion patterns of military HMO's can lead to a better understanding and
more correct projections of the demands on medical resources attendant
to implementing the general populations right to adequate health care.
The present paper is a preliminary report of inpatient utiliza-
tion patterns based on data collected from Silas B. Hays Army Hospital
at Fort Ord, California for a two year period (1971 and 1972). A
larger comprehensive study covering both in and outpatient utilization
patterns is underway and will encompass other military HMO's as well.
In the instant paper we limit ourselves to length of stay analyses for
20 of the 22 international morbidity code categories identified by
Joseph. Mean length of stay for each category is calculated from the
sample and compared with that realized in the fee-for-service (ffs)
plus coinsurance case of Joseph's study.
ANALYSIS
Comparing the mean lengths of stay for 20 disease/conditions
for inpatients at Silas B. Hays Army Hospital with those obtained by
Hyman Joseph [1] requires a precise statistical formulation. Let
u. be the mean length of hospital stay at Silas B. Hays Army Hospital
for disease/ condition i, with u . the corresponding mean length of
stay for the Iowa Hospital in [1]. The hypothesis to be tested is that
patients with observed "disease" i admitted to Hays Army Hospital
actually stayed no longer than those admitted for the same condition
at the Iowa Hospitals. That is:
HI- •
H, : u . ^ u . for some given x
1 XI
The following notation is adopted:




N = sample size of patients for disease i at an Iowa Hospital,
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S . = sample variance of hospital stays for disease i at Iowa
Hospital,
N = sample size of patients for disease i at Silas B. Hays
Army Hospital,
X^ . = sample mean length of hospital stay for disease i at Silas
B. Hays Army Hospital,
S^ . = sample variance from the mean length of stay for disease i
at Silas B. Hayes Army Hospital.
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represents the pooled variance.
The merits of the t-test may generally be said to rest upon
the validity of the assumptions leading to its use. These assumptions
are as follows
:
1. Both populations (sampled from) have, normal distributions.
2. The variances of each population are the same (homoscedacticity)
.
Under these assumptions, t. has a t distribution with N_. + N T7 . - 2l Ii Hi
degrees of freedom. In cases where homoscedasticity cannot be justi-
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which, if the assumptions of normality are correct, has approximately




Interpolation may be necessary if df is not an integer,
The degree to which t ! yields increased validity over t.
varies inversely with sample size, all things equal. This is so since
the t distribution rapidly approaches the standard normal as the
degrees of freedom reaches 30. Since our sample sizes are well above
30 for the most part, we should not expect this distinction to be
material.
The importance of the normality assumption is also significantly
diminished by the central limit theorem which would have t. being
distributed as a standard normal for large sample sizes regardless of
the underlying form of the populations. Since our sample sizes range
from 30 to 3000 with 4 exceptions, we should not expect deviations from
normality to be material. The upshot is that t. may be used with
confidence in the sense that it is not sensitive to departures from
underlying assumptions.
Table 1 summarizes the statistical results from the procedure
outlined above.
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The following diseases/conditions were significant at a .99
level of significance since t m for all diseases/conditions was
-2.326: That is, H is rejected for the following diseases.
Diabetes Mellitus
Hemorrhoids
Hypertrophy of tonsils and adenoids
Ulcer of Duodenum
Gastritis and Duodenitis, Gastrohepatitis
Acute appendicitis
Hernia of abdominal cavity without mention of obstruction
Fracture of neck of femur, hip.
If the confidence limit was relaxed to .95 an additional
disease/condition was significant:
Cholelithiasis, Colic
As a first approximation to interpreting the results of this
data, we may simply note that for the 9 morbidity conditions noted above,
the Hays Hospital and the free comprehensive case system did have signi-
ficantly longer lengths of stay. However, in 11 of the 20 cases the
hypothesis was not rejected.
It should immediately be noted that the data from Hays Hospital
was not age or sex adjusted for differences in the population served
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vis-a-vis the population of the Iowa Hospitals. However, a qualitative
consideration of the probable differences in the populations would seem
to mitigate the failure of the hypothesis in at least some of the cases
cited above. For example, it appears that a more significant proportion
of the "enrollees" at military HMO's are in the over 60 age class because
of the existence of a large retired military population on the Monterey
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Peninsula. This, of course, leads to longer lengths of stay, ceteris
paribus, compared to civilian eligible populations.
There also exist institutional differences in hospital policies
which tend to result in longer stays in military HMO's and would not be
present in the usual civilian counterpart. These include the existence
of "medical boards" and the recuperative role of the HMO.
"Medical boards" are formal medical inquiries made after certain
types of illnesses in order to determine whether active duty personnel
are fit to resume their previous positions. These unfortunately take
a not insignificant amount of time (which varies with the type of illness)
during which period the patient remains attached to the hospital even
though he is medically "cured," in the sense inpatient care is no longer
necessary. Thus, in the case of fractures and hernia's for example, we
might expect, a priori, longer stays in Hays vs the Iowa group.
By the same token, there exist patients who in "normal" (i.e.
civilian) circumstances would be sent home to finish recuperation but
can't be sent back to the barracks for lack of even cursory custodial
care. They are thus kept on in their inpatient role, leading to longer
lengths of stay. This may well explain the failure of the hypothesis
in cases such as diabetes mellitus, hemorrhoids, etc., which require
such periods of recuperation.
These results, however formal, are qualitative and difficult
for a policymaker to interpret unless we include an overall measure of
hospital utilization such as "patient-day equivalents." Very simply,
we view the data from the Iowa Hospital as a base and then compare the
number of patient-days for each disease at Iowa Hospital with the
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corresponding number at Silas B. Hays—adjusted to account for the
difference in sample sizes. Table 2 summarizes the results.
The bulk of the difference of 21,000 is due to appendicitis and
neck fracture, where in both cases the sample sizes at Silas were small.
If these two cases are ignored, the difference comprises a mere two-thirds
of one per cent increase at Hays. Further comparisons of a more con-







Diabetes Mellitus 3700 4900





Acute Bronchitis 3800 3190
Hypertrophy of T and A 2300 3120
Ulcer of Duodenum 3810 5980
Gastritis 1880 3100
Acute Appendicitis 2880 7650
Hernia 5630 7160
Gastroenteritis and Colitis 3760 2120
Cholelithiasis, Colic 4670 6280
Cholecystritis 2250 2450








We began by pointing out that for purposes of estimating the
total costs of various size comprehensive health care bills the relevant
concept is not "moral hazard" as usually defined, but rather relative
moral hazard, the tendency for an individual to increase utilization
over what they might have done under a ffs plus coinsurance system,
which is most prevalent presently.
Although we by no means have proven that relative moral hazard
does not exist, we believe that our initial and admittedly crude exam-
ination of a military HMO, adjusted for characteristics which would not
be present in a civilian prepaid facility, indicates that projections
of great per capita jumps in the consumption of free inpatient care
may well have been exaggerated.
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The problems involved in such an assertion are addressed later in
the paper.
2. The daily "rations" charge runs from $1.25 for enlisted men to
$1.75 for officers.
3. Further, they do not have the same potential economic incentive to
under prescribe that doctors who are members of a profit sharing
group may have.
4. We are as yet unable to rigorously perform such an operation due to
the unavailability of age-sex data directly with the morbidity and
diagnosis data, and the as yet incomplete development of a method
of defining the exact population served by military HMO's. This
stems from accessibility to cure by both active and retired military
personnel and dependents in overlapping health care districts. One
of the authors (Whipple) is presently directing a study to provide
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